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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff-Respondent, i 
V 1 
V • l 
STEVEN FISHER, 1 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
t Case No. 870569-CA 
t Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the denial of defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea, and from his conviction of theft 
under Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404. Defendant's motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea was denied on September 24, 1987 (R. 27). 
Defendant's judgment and commitment were filed on November 16, 
1987. (R. 32,33). 
Defendant'8 notice of appeal of both the denial of his 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea and of his conviction was 
filed on November 19, 1987 in the trial court (R. 36). On 
December 4, 1987, the Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to 
this Court (R. 41). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did defendant waive his opportunity to challenge the 
use of a polygraph as the -basis of the plea bargain" by omitting 
this argument in the proceedings for plea withdrawal before the 
trial court? 
2. Would it have been an abuse of discretion for the 
trial court to reject defendant's argument now made on appeal, if 
the argument had been raised during defendant's proceedings for 
the withdrawal of his guilty plea? 
3. Does the record provided support defendant's claims 
that the polygraph results were somehow unfair or deceptive? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative statutes and constitutional provisions 
are set out in full in the appendix to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information, signed on April 
21, 1987, with theft, a second degree felony, as defined in Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-6-404. (R. 2). Defendant was arraigned in circuit 
court on April 21, 1987, and preliminary hearing was scheduled on 
May 19, 1987, at which time defendant waived his right to a 
preliminary hearing, and defendant was then bound over to the 
district court (R. 7, 9). 
On June 1, 1987, defendant pleaded guilty to a reduced 
charge of theft, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. 
$ 76-6-404. (R. 17). Defendant signed an affidavit detailing his 
understanding of the rights he was waiving by entering his plea 
of guilty (R. 11-16). 
Defendant'8 affidavit also detailed an agreement 
between himself and the State, which agreement involved 
defendant's submission to a polygraph examination after his 
entrance of his guilty plea (R. 11-15). The agreement provided 
that if the results of the polygraph test indicated that 
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defendant were telling the truth when he claimed that he had not 
participated in the theft, the theft charge against defendant 
would be dismissed, and the State would consent to the withdrawal 
of defendant'8 guilty plea; if the results of defendant's 
polygraph test were inconclusive as to his truthfulness in 
claiming that he had not participated in the theft, he would have 
thirty days in which to move for the withdrawal of his guilty 
plea; and if the polygraph test indicated that defendant were 
lying when he claimed that he had not participated in the theft, 
the guilty plea would stand, and defendant would pay $12, 050.19 
in restitution (R. 13-14, 17). The State of Utah agreed to 
abstain from filing additional charges of theft and embezzlement 
in exchange for payment of restitution by defendant (R. 13). The 
entrance of defendant's guilty plea was conditioned on the trial 
court's acceptance of the polygraph agreement (R. 14). 
On August 3, 1987, the trial court indicated in a 
minute entry that the prosecution had indicated that defendant 
"failed the polygraph testM, and the court then stated that 
defendant's guilty plea would stand (R. 18). 
On September 24, 1987, Judge Wilkinson denied 
defendant's motion to set aside the guilty plea (R. 27). That 
motion was based on three arguments: 
a) That Defendant was not sufficiently 
apprised that his former attorney, Grant W. 
Morrison, had agreed to additional 
restitution of $12, 050.19, and other, which 
included other alleged embezzlements besides 
the one charged. 
b) That Defendant was told that he did not 
fail the polygraph but that it was or could 
be said to be inconclusive and that the plea 
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negotiation was that the case would be 
dismissed if Defendant passes the polygraph 
examination. 
c) That in accordance with said plea 
negotiation, no polygraph examination was 
conducted concerning the alleged series of 
embezzlements by the Defendant. 
(R. 21-22). 
The trial court's judgment and commitment was entered 
on November 16, 1987 (R. 32-33). Defendant was initially 
sentenced on November 2, 1987, to 0-5 years in the Utah State 
Prison and a $5,000 fine, but that sentence was later suspended, 
on the conditions that defendant complete eighteen months of 
probation, serve ten days in the county jail, perform three 
hundred hours of community service, and pay $12,050.19 in 
restitution (R. 31). 
Defendant's notice of appeal from the denial and from 
the judgment and conviction was filed on November 19, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The information in this case reads, in part, as 
follows: 
The undersigned Terry L. Christiansen 
under oath states on information and belief 
that the defendant(s) committed the crime(s) 
of: THEFT, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 
6, Section 404, UCA 1953, as amended, a 
Second Degree Felony, as follows, to wit: 
That on or about the 26th day of March, 
1985, in Summit County, State of Utah, the 
defendant, Steven Michael Fisher, obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the 
property of Yarrow Associates with a purpose 
to deprive Yarrow Associates of said property 
and that the value of said property was more 
than $1,000.00. 
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(R. 2). The facts alleged in the information are somewhat 
modified by defendant's affidavit in paragraph 12: 
•.. I ... ask the Court to accept my plea 
of guilty to the charge set forth in this 
Affidavit because I did, in fact on the 26th 
day of March, 1985, obtain or exercise 
unauthorized control over the property of 
Yarrow associates, with a purpose to deprive 
Yarrow Associates of said property and that 
the value of said property was more than 
$250.00, but did not exceed $1,000.00. 
(R. 14-15). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant waived his opportunity to challenge the 
use of a polygraph as the "basis of the plea bargain" by omitting 
this argument in the proceedings for plea withdrawal before the 
trial court. 
2. It would not have been an abuse of discretion for 
the trial court to reject defendant's argument now made on 
appeal, if the argument had been raised during defendant's 
proceedings for the withdrawal of his guilty plea. 
3. The record provided does not support defendant's 
claims that the polygraph results were somehow unfair or 
deceptive. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS OPPORTUNITY TO CHALLENGE 
THE USE OF A POLYGRAPH AS THE "BASIS OF THE 
PLEA AGREEMENT". 
As noted above in the Statement of the Case, 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was based on three 
arguments: 
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a) That Defendant was not sufficiently 
apprised that his former attorney, Grant W. 
Morrison, had agreed to additional 
restitution of $12, 050.19, and other, which 
included other alleged embezzlements besides 
the one charged. 
b) That Defendant was told that he did not 
fail the polygraph but that it was or could 
be said to be inconclusive and that the plea 
negotiation was that the case would be 
dismissed if Defendant passes the polygraph 
examination. 
c) That in accordance with said plea 
negotiation, no polygraph examination was 
conducted concerning the alleged series of 
embezzlements by the Defendant. 
(R. 21-22). 
No fair reading of these arguments can lead to the 
conclusion that the lower court was given the opportunity to 
decide, as defendant now asks this Court to decide, whether or 
not defendant's plea was entered involuntarily because he did not 
understand the polygraph (Hthe reliance of the device by the 
defendant was not properly explained to him" (A.B. 5)). 
To allow defendant to succeed in resting his appeal on 
this new argument, which was never presented to the trial court, 
would ignore Utah precedent on waiver, and the policies of 
finality and division of labor among the courts behind those 
precedents. See State v. Loe, 732 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1987) 
(defendant cannot claim for the first time on appeal that 
statements made to police officer were involuntary); Jaramillo 
v. Turner, 465 P.2d 343, 344 (Utah 1970) (waiver rule is 
ordinarily applicable in plea context); State v. Kelbach, 461 
P.2d 297, 301 (Utah 1969) (defendants, who objected at trial to 
the legality of police procedure in administering paraffin tests, 
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but who did not object to the reliability of those tests at 
trial, were barred from raising the latter issue on appeal); In 
the Interest of Oaks, 571 P.2d 1364, 1365 (Utah 1977) (defendant, 
who failed to challenge the reliability of the results of a 
breathalyzer tests at trial, could not raise the issue on 
appeal); State v, Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah 1985) (defendant may 
not argue the constitutionality of his pre-trial show-up on 
appeal without having raised the issue at trial); State v, 
Valdez, 432 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1967) (it is improper to change 
grounds for objections on appeal, after losing on different 
grounds at trial); State v. Chancellor, 704 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah 
1985) (defendant cannot attack probable cause for his arrest for 
the first time on appeal); City of St. George v. Gubler, 569 P.2d 
1099, 1100 (Utah 1977) (constitutional right to counsel could not 
be addressed on appeal because issue was not raised before trial 
court); State v. Sparks, 672 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah 1983) (failure to 
address issue of limited cross-examination on the record 
precluded appellate review of the issue); State v. Lancaster, 665 
P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1983) (Under the old Utah Rule of Evidence 
4, court would not reach issue of constitutionality of the 
implied consent law for those suspected of driving under the 
influence, because the defendant failed to provide a trial 
transcript, and the court could not tell whether the objection 
had been made to the trial court). 
The State submits that this Court should dismiss this 
appeal on the basis of defendant's waiver of argument to the 
trial court. 
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POINT II 
IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO REJECT DEFENDANT'S 
ARGUMENT NOW MADE ON APPEAL, IF THE ARGUMENT 
HAD BEEN RAISED DURING DEFENDANT'S PROCEED-
INGS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
For purposes of argument only, and in the event that 
this Court deems it appropriate to address the merits in this 
case, the State will assume a hypothetical: that defendant's 
argument that his plea was entered involuntarily as a result of 
his failure to understand the polygraph test, was presented to 
the trial court, who concluded that the argument did not 
constitute good cause for the withdrawal of the plea. 
This Court's standard of review of a trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is set 
forth in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988): 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6 (1982) states, in 
part, MA plea of guilty . . . may be 
withdrawn only upon good cause shown with 
leave of court." We will not interfere with 
a trial judge's determination that a 
defendant has failed to show good cause 
unless it clearly appears that the trial 
judge abused his discretion. State v. 
Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 423 (Utah 1987). 
Id. at 93. Had the trial court in the instant case been faced 
with defendant's argument on appeal, he would have been well 
within his discretion in concluding that the argument does not 
constitute good cause for withdrawal of the plea. 
In State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 
1988), this Court found that the Utah Supreme Court, in State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), replaced the -record as a 
whole" test for evaluating the validity of the entrance of guilty 
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pleas with a "strict Rule 11(e) compliance test". Vasilacopulos 
at 94. This Court statedi 
In its statement of law, the Gibbons Court 
held, "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial 
courts the burden of ensuring that 
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements 
are complied with when a guilty plea is 
entered." j^ d. Trial courts may not rely on 
defense counsel or executed affidavits to 
satisfy the specific requirements of Rule 
11(e). Id. at 1313. Rather, with or without 
an affidavit or defense counsel's advice, the 
trial court must conduct an on-the-record 
review with defendant of the Rule 11(e) 
requirements. jUl. at 1314. 
Vasilacopulos at 94. 
Defendant seeks to bring this case under Utah R. Crim. 
P. Rule 11(e) under subsection (2), which deals with the 
voluntariness of the entrance of the plea, by drawing an analogy 
between Vasilacopulos and the instant case - just as 
Vasilacopulos's failure to understand the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences rendered the entrance of his 
guilty plea involuntary, defendant's failure to understand the 
polygraph in the instant case rendered the entrance of his guilty 
plea involuntary. He contends that he should have been "advised 
as to the nature and possible unreliability of the polygraph" 
(A.B. 4), and "advised . . . of the fact that he had the right to 
have the examination conducted according to certain standards, or 
his right to a hearing and a finding as to if his results fell 
into which [sic] category of the plea agreement," (A.B. 6), but 
cites no authority for these propositions. 
The State can find no authority requiring that 
defendants entering conditional pleas be given such advice about 
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the collateral effects of their plea bargains (i.e. Should the 
defendants in State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), and 
in State v. Geer 96 Ut. Adv. Rep. 24 (Utah App. 1988) have been 
advised as to the "nature and possible unreliability" of 
appellate review? Should the defendant in State v, Kayf 717 P.2d 
1294 (Utah 1986)/ have been advised as to the nature of life 
imprisonment?). Caselaw indicates the contrary. See e.g., State 
v. Music, 698 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Wash.App. 1985) (Defendant's claim 
that his plea was entered involuntarily because he was not 
informed of the guidelines used by the Board of Prison Terms and 
Paroles in setting his sentence was rejected by the court: "[T]he 
State correctly points out that a defendant need only be advised 
of all the direct consequences of a plea, and not possible 
collateral consequences"). 
Even if there were such a requirement for the trial 
court to insure that defendant understood the collateral effects 
of his plea agreement, defendant presents no record facts to 
support his argument that he failed to understand the polygraph, 
and thereby fails to meet his burden of proof in challenging the 
trial court's hypothetical actions. See Mayne v. Turner, 468 
P.2d 369, 371 (Utah 1970) (to overcome presumption that trial 
court was correct in authorizing the entrance of the guilty plea, 
defendant must show that he was clearly prejudiced by a denial of 
his constitutional rights). Through his choice not to include 
the transcripts from the trial court, he has deprived the State 
and this Court the opportunity of finding any evidence to support 
his claim. Absent defendant's provision of an adequate record to 
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evaluate his claim, this Court should deny him relief. See 
Bennett Leasing Company v. Ellison, 387 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah 1963) 
("In the absence of a transcript of the evidence we are obliged 
to assume that it would support the findings."); First Federal 
Savings and Loan v. Schamanekf 684 P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984) 
("An appellant has the obligation to provide an adequate record 
on appeal for reviewing a trial judge's ruling. In the absence 
of a record, we must, and in this case do, presume that the trial 
court's rulings are correct."); Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763, 
765 (Utah 1985) ("Where the record before us is incomplete, we 
are unable to review the evidence as a whole and must therefore 
presume that the verdict was supported by admissible and 
competent evidence."). 
If defendant had presented the argument he now presents 
on appeal to the trial court during his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea, the trial court would not have committed a clear 
abuse of discretion in denying the motion. 
POINT III 
THE RECORD PROVIDED DOES NOT SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS THAT THE POLYGRAPH RESULTS 
WERE SOMEHOW UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE. 
Defendant makes much of the fact that the plea was 
conditioned on an "a posteriori" polygraph. A posteriori is 
defined in Webster's New International Dictionary, unabridged 
Second Edition of 1938 as "... b Designating, or pertaining to, 
what cannot be known except from experience.•.". The majority of 
conditional pleas are conditioned on "a posteriori" events, such 
as appellate review of an evidentiary dispute. See e.g., State 
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v, Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah 1988) (no contest plea 
conditioned on appeal of suppression issue is acceptable), and 
cases cited therein. 
The fact that it is permissible for a trial court to 
approve as the condition for the entrance of a plea something 
other than the appellate resolution of an evidentiary dispute is 
demonstrated by State v. Kayf 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986), where 
the Utah Supreme Court approved a guilty plea conditioned on the 
trial court's sentencing defendant to life in prison, as opposed 
to the imposing the death penalty. The Kay court held that 
-neither the statute governing the sentencing of capital felons 
nor Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure prevented Kay 
from entering and the trial judge from accepting the conditional 
plea presented here.- Id. at 1296. See also, Gardner v. State, 
537 P.2d 469, 472 (Nev. 1975) (initial plea bargain provided that 
"the prosecution would pay [defendant's] counsel fees, pay his 
back wages, and notify the press of his innocence. The promise 
was conditioned upon Gardner's passing the polygraph test.")• 
Defendant complains that -there is no judicial review 
of the results- of the polygraph, (A.B. 4), and complains that 
the plea bargain in his case failed to meet the standards for 
stipulations to admission of polygraph results set forth in State 
v. Reberteranof 681 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1984). What defendant fails 
to recognize is that he did have an opportunity for judicial 
review of his polygraph at the hearing on his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea. That was also the proper forum for discussing 
the questionable applicability of Reberterano in this context. 
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Defendant directs the Court's attention to R. 26, the 
Polygraph Examination Report, claiming that the -6 deceptive 
score, the -3 inconclusive score, and the aggregate score of -6 
(deceptive) indicate "Deception pursuant to the negotiated plea 
agreement". (A.B. 7). While the omission of defendant's argument 
at the trial level and defendant's choice not to include a 
transcript of the proceedings below deprive this Court of a 
technical explanation of the scores, reference to the Polygraph 
Examination Report and defendant's affidavit demonstrates that 
defendant received the benefits of his bargain. Even if the 
aggregate score should have been a -4 1/2 or some other figure 
between the -3 and the -6, the result would not have been a 
figure representing defendant's truthfulness, but only an 
inconclusive score. (R. 26 on back). Under the plea agreement, 
had defendant received an inconclusive score, he was entitled to 
move to withdraw his plea, which is exactly what he did in this 
case. (R. 14; 21-22). His argument that his score was only "one 
point over the scale of conclusive versus inconclusive" (A.B. 6) 
should be rejected on the same grounds. 
Defendant's claims that the polygraph questions were 
"formulated in a cumbersome manner because the defendant was a 
manager", and that the questions were "indirect" and "covered 
legitimate activities of employment" (R. 6), are belied by 
reference to the Polygraph Examination Report, which provides the 
only available samples of the questions asked: 
Regarding the theft at the Yarrow-Holiday 
Inn do you intend to tell the truth to each 
question about that? 
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Did you take any money not legally yours 
from the Yarrow-Holiday Inn? 
Did you recieve [sic] checks from patrons 
and not post the checks on company records? 
Did you deposit any unposted checks to 
cover monies you had taken? 
(R. 26). 
Defendant'8 allegations and implications that the 
polygraph results in this case were somehow unfair or deceptive 
are contradicted by the record he designated for appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The State submits that this Court need not reach the 
merits of this appeal because defendant waived his opportunity to 
attack the propriety of conditioning a guilty plea on a polygraph 
examination when he failed to make that argument to the trial 
court in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
If this Court reaches the merits of this case, it 
should uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. Conditional plea bargains are 
authorized under Utah law. There is no authority for the 
proposition that the trial court should have insured defendant's 
understanding of the polygraph test, no evidence that defendant 
-14-
failed to understand the polygraph, and no evidence that the plea 
agreement was not fulfilled in a fair and complete manner. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this \ L^fay of January, 
1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney ffieneri 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to John R. Bucher, attorney for defendant, 1518 South 1100 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, this // day of January, 1989. % 
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